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This paper analyses the properties of the advanced Opaque booking systems used by online 
travel agencies in conjunction with their traditional transparent booking system. In section 2 an 
updated literature review is presented. This review underlines the interest and the specificities 
of Opaque goods in the Tourism Industry. It also characterises properties of the Name-Your-
Own-Price channel introduced by Priceline and the Opaque channel developed by Hotwire. 
Then, in section 3, the possibility of joint-implementation of more than one opaque booking 
system by an online intermediary is discussed. Finally, in section 4, intuitions and preliminary 
results are presented. 
Keywords: Opaque Selling, Name-Your-Own-Price, Pricing Strategies, Distribution Systems, 
Economics of Tourism, Online Travel Agencies, Probabilistic Goods. 
1 Introduction 
In the last years, emergence of the Internet has deeply changed the industry of 
tourism, organisation of markets and pricing mechanisms developed by firms. 
Tourism is by far the most developed and innovative online business, fostered by 
creation of online travel agencies (OTAs) of different kinds and sophisticated pricing 
and segmentation strategies. Leading global OTAs have emerged1 which dominate 
the distribution of travel and tourism services. However, extensive uses of the Internet 
have given rise to niche players. Some of these players have specialised in innovative 
pricing models. Hotwire.com2
                                                          
1Expedia, Travelocity, Orbitz, Opodo 
and Priceline.com are the most important companies 
having successfully developed this strategy on the US market. They have developed 
Opaque offers, in which the services’ characteristics are concealed (hotel or airlines 
brands, exacts hotels’ location or travel schedule) until the payment is completed, and 
online pricing mechanisms such as Name-Your-Own-Price in which instead of 
posting a price, the seller waits for a potential buyer’s offer that he can either accept 
or reject. These empirical developments open many different questions. Why would 
hotels and airline companies be willing to sell their products through 
Priceline/Hotwire and lose advantages (and profit) of product differentiation (Shapiro 
and Shi, [2008])? Certain firms should find these strategies more profitable. But as 
pointed out by Wilson and Zhang [2008], 'though on-line auctions are a multi-billion 
dollar annual activity, with a growing variety of sophisticated trading mechanisms, 
scientific research on them is at an early stage'. Nevertheless, some interesting 
2 acquired by Expedia in 2003 
 advances can be traced in the recent literature, related to the innovative strategies 
implemented by Priceline or Hotwire. A short literature review is provided in section 
2. Then, in section 3, an important issue still not elucidated is presented, which is the 
focus of this paper: since many variants of Opaque systems exist, is there an 
advantage for an online intermediary to use simultaneously more than one opaque 
distribution channel?  In order to answer this question the case of monopoly facing a 
heterogeneous demand is considered. Afterwards, in section 4, intuitions and 
preliminary results are discussed. 
2 NYOP and Opaque Posted-Price Selling:  A Literature Review 
Recent literature developments focus either on NYOP channel or on posted-price 
opaque selling. Indeed, none of existing papers combines nor compares these two 
types of opaque booking mechanisms, what makes the present paper’s originality. 
Moreover, most literature on NYOP selling mechanism even omits the question of 
products’ opacity (except the ones of Wang, Gal-Or, Chatterjee [2005] and Shapiro, 
Zillante [2007]). Hence, in this short survey first questions related to NYOP booking 
channel will be considered and second - the issues relative to opaque products. 
First, it should be underlined that an intermediary implements a NYOP selling 
mechanism to improve its profits, by successfully segmenting the demand in order 
price discriminate its clients (Wilson, Zhang [2008]; Shapiro, Zillante [2009]; Wang, 
Gal-Or, Chatterjee [2005]; Hann, Terwiesch [2003]), and therefore to reduce price 
competition (for further information on the case of duopoly, see Fay [2008]). Demand 
can be segmented either because consumers are differentiated by their price 
sensitivity/willingness to pay or by the levels of haggling, frictional and transaction 
costs that they can afford (Hann, Terwiesch [2003]; Terwiesch, Savin, Hann [2005]; 
Fay [2008]). Moreover, in order to retain the largest part of consumer’s surplus, 
Priceline restricts its clients to a single bid. Some travellers manage to bypass this 
restriction (Fay [2004]), which is detrimental for intermediary’s profits (on the 
opposite of hypothetical possibility of repeated bidding (Spann, Skiera, Schäfers 
[2004]; Fay [2008]), which additionally reduces consumer’s uncertainty).  
The second line of research analyses another mode of opaque selling, where prices are 
posted. These papers focus on the fact that some product's attributes or characteristics 
are concealed. On traditional channels it was already not always beneficial to fully 
inform consumers about market prices, because of the risk of their price sensitivity 
increase and then - of creation of downward price pressures. Thus, it is beneficial for 
service providers to implement multichannel distribution across mechanisms with 
different levels of market transparency (Grandos, Gupta, Kauffman [2008]), because 
channel differentiation decreases price competition and allows price discrimination 
(Shapiro, Shi [2008]). This result is all the more important, if high rate consumers are 
sufficiently brand-loyal (Fay [2008]). Moreover, opaque selling can be defined as 
probabilistic selling, providing a buffer against seller’s own uncertainty and though 
helping him to segment the market (Fay, Xie [2008]). Finally, opaque selling is not 
 only beneficial for the intermediary, but also impacts overall welfare by enabling very 
price sensitive consumers to travel (Jiang [2007]). 
3 Issue, General Settings and Cases to Consider 
This paper tends to answer an important question, not yet developed in the existing 
literature: is it suitable and efficient for an OTA to implement simultaneously more 
than one Opaque channel? 
3.1. General Settings  
Supposing that everyday there are two flights from city1 to city2: the first one leaves 
city1 at 7am and the other at 6pm. The flight booking level on the traditional channel 
is estimated with a small error only few days before the departure date. The OTA 
knows the distribution of states of the world, which are defined by Table 1. 
Table 1. Available seats for the flights from city1 to city2 on a given date 
States of the world Number and type of available tickets Probability 
1 m seats at 7:00am flight 1/4 
2 m seats at 6:00pm flight 1/4 
3 2m seats at 7:00am flight 1/8 
4 
m seats at 7:00am flight 
m seats at 6:00pm flight 
1/4 
5 2m seats at 6:00pm flight 1/8 
There are 2n potential travellers, differentiated by their willingness to pay, distributed 
in two subpopulations of n agents. Travellers belonging to subpopulation A prefer the 
7am flight and subpopulation B - the 6pm flight. There are more potential travellers 
than available seats in any state of the world, i.e. n>>m. Each subset of n potential 
travellers is distributed uniformly on segment [0, a] with a>0 representing agent’s 
maximum willingness to pay. Agents are all risk neutral, i.e. they care only about 
maximising their utility (Sandmo [1971]). If agent decides not to purchase the product 
and not to bid, or his bid is not accepted, his utility vanishes.    
The intermediary can implement either: (1) an Opaque “Hotwire style” posted-price 
system; (2) a NYOP “Priceline style” system; (3) both systems. The timing of actions 
is as follows: 
• At stage 1, the OTA chooses between (1), (2) and (3). The OTA fixes the price for 
the Opaque channel and/or launches a single bid process on the NYOP channel. 
• At stage 2, potential travellers purchase (or not) tickets on the Opaque channel 
and/or they choose to post (or not) a single bid at the NYOP channel. 
 • At stage 3, the OTA knows the exact number (m or 2m) of available seats on each 
flight. The OTA sets the threshold price for the NYOP channel and sells the 
tickets to those whose bids exceed this price. Each successful bidder pays the rate 
that he has posted. 
The relevant equilibrium concept is Stackelberg equilibrium (Stackelberg [1934]), 
where the OTA is the leader and potential customers are considered as followers, i.e. 
the intermediary acts first and only after his decision, that is observed by consumers, 
they choose their own actions. Accordingly, the game is solved by backward 
induction: at stage 3, the OTA chooses the best action (i.e. it sets the lower limit price 
for the NYOP channel, if (1) and (3) have been selected), given the action previously 
taken by travellers at stage 2; at stage 2 potential travellers choose their own best 
actions, given the OTA’s decisions at stage 1 (the system implemented and the 
Opaque channels’ price), their expectations of OTA’s decisions at stage 3 and level of  
information on the chance that the bid gets accepted; at stage 1, the OTA chooses the 
appropriate distribution strategy and the Opaque channel’s price if (1) or (3) is 
implemented. 
3.2. Cases to consider 
Considering the travellers’ information completeness levels the future model will 
analyse two settings. First, in case of complete but imperfect information about the 
states of the world, potential passengers know the exact number and the distribution 
of available seats, as well as the other agents’ propensity to pay. Under those settings, 
optimal prices, profits and welfare levels for each possible distribution strategy will 
be calculated. The results of this first case will be considered as a benchmark to the 
second section of the model. Indeed, the case of imperfect and incomplete 
information will be then examined, what means that the agents estimate imprecisely 
the distance between their own location and the position of the agent with the highest 
propensity to pay. Given the number of tickets available and the possible uncertainty 
levels, three situations are to be considered: (1) small number of tickets available 
(lower than half of the number of potential travellers) and moderate uncertainty; (2) 
small number of tickets but relatively strong uncertainty; (3) the number of tickets 
higher than half of the number of potential travellers. 
4 Preliminary and Expected Results Discussion  
It is quite complicated to decide, if two or more forms of Opaque channels can 
coexist. Both considered channels are opaque, i.e. they do not provide precise 
information to travellers on the quality of the travel. If passengers had complete 
information on the flight frequency and the other ticket’s attributes and if they knew 
the distribution of the other consumers’ propensity to pay, all of them would choose 
to use the NYOP system, and quit the Opaque channel, because each consumer would 
be able to bid a price corresponding to his reservation price. Thus, it is equivalent for 
the OTA to implement NYOP channel alone or to jointly-implement both systems.  
 If passenger’s information is imperfect and incomplete, depending on traveller’s 
uncertainty levels, two types of results are expected. On one hand, if uncertainty is 
strong, potential travellers estimate their relative propensity to pay very inexactly. 
They imagine that they would have to bid very high in order to get the ticket at the 
NYOP channel, while the posted price on the Opaque channel seems to them to be 
lower. Consequently, in case of joint implementation, potential passengers would 
purchase the tickets on the posted-price Opaque channel. On the other hand, if 
uncertainty is moderate, potential travellers are able to better estimate their relative 
propensity to pay. If the two systems are jointly implemented, agents who 
underestimate their relative propensity to pay would purchase at the Opaque posted-
price channel in order to be sure to travel, while the others, who estimate their relative 
propensity to pay as high, would bid at the NYOP channel. Thus, the joint 
implementation of the two systems seems to be the optimal solution for the OTA. 
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